Omoyele Sowore has faulted Femi Gbajabiamila’s appointment as chairman of Nigeria’s Presidential Task Force on Ebola Preparedness, questioning the decision to place President Bola Tinubu’s Chief of Staff in charge of a national public health coordination body. His criticism comes as Uganda seeks detailed travel and medical information from Nigeria following the confirmation of an Ebola case in Abuja.
In a statement published on Wednesday, October 21, 2026, the African Action Congress (AAC) presidential candidate questioned the government’s choice of leadership, Nigeria’s handling of information about the infected traveller and the possibility of using a public health emergency to restrict democratic freedoms ahead of the 2027 general elections.
The controversy has also drawn attention to the task force’s original mandate, its funding and whether the country’s preparedness arrangements are delivering the coordination promised when the committee was established in June.
Why Sowore Is Challenging Gbajabiamila’s Appointment
Sowore’s main objection concerns the appointment of Gbajabiamila, a former Speaker of the House of Representatives who currently serves as President Tinubu’s Chief of Staff, to chair the Presidential Task Force on Ebola Virus Disease Preparedness and Emerging Public Health Threats.
The activist questioned the suitability of a political appointee without a medical background to lead a committee dealing with a serious infectious disease threat. His position is that specialists in epidemiology, infectious diseases and public health should play leading roles in decisions requiring technical expertise.
The criticism raises an important distinction between political coordination and medical leadership. A government-appointed task force can bring ministries, security agencies, immigration officials, airport authorities and state governments together. However, the technical assessment of an outbreak requires the expertise of public health professionals.
The Federal Government has said the task force includes relevant ministries, departments, agencies and state representatives, with the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) providing technical leadership and coordination.
Sowore’s objection, therefore, is not simply about Gbajabiamila’s political position. It concerns whether the leadership structure is appropriate for the responsibilities assigned to the committee.
How Tinubu Appointed Gbajabiamila as Ebola Task Force Chairman
The appointment predates Nigeria’s latest confirmed Ebola case.
On June 9, 2026, President Tinubu approved the establishment of the Presidential Task Force on Ebola Virus Disease Preparedness and Emerging Public Health Threats. The announcement was issued by the State House through the President’s Special Adviser on Information and Strategy, Bayo Onanuga.
The President designated Gbajabiamila, his Chief of Staff, as chairman of the task force and approved the immediate release of ₦10 billion in emergency intervention funding.
According to the Presidency, the money was intended to strengthen the operational preparedness of the NCDC and support critical national public health emergency response activities.
The decision followed a stakeholder meeting chaired by Gbajabiamila to review Nigeria’s preparedness and develop strategies to prevent the possible importation of Ebola.
Representatives from the Ministry of Interior, Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, Lagos State Government and other relevant institutions participated in the discussions.
The government outlined several proposed preventive measures, including intensified passenger screening at international airports, enhanced monitoring of passengers arriving through designated high-risk routes, and the activation of referral and isolation centres at the Lagos and Abuja international airports.
The task force was also directed to consider QR code-based pre-arrival health declarations for passengers originating from or transiting through designated high-risk countries. Other proposed measures included coordinating with aviation and diplomatic authorities on flights from affected areas.
On June 18, the Federal Government formally inaugurated the committee at the State House in Abuja.
Speaking at the inauguration, Gbajabiamila said: “We do not want a repeat of what happened during the last outbreak when a carrier entered the country, and everyone was scrambling to respond.”
He also declared: “We will not follow; we will lead.”
The committee’s stated objective was to strengthen preventive arrangements and avoid a disorderly response if Ebola or another emerging public health threat reached Nigeria.
Nigeria’s confirmation of an Ebola case on October 20 has since placed those preparations under renewed scrutiny.
What Uganda Wants From Nigeria
Uganda’s request for information has become a central part of the controversy surrounding Nigeria’s response.
Nigeria’s Ministry of Health confirmed on October 20 that a woman who had recently arrived on an international flight from Uganda had tested positive for Ebola. She was receiving medical care in isolation, while authorities reported identifying 44 close contacts and commencing contact tracing.
The Nigerian government had not publicly established the precise location of infection in the announcement confirming the case.
After Nigerian authorities confirmed the Ebola infection, Uganda’s Ministry of Health clarified that the woman’s travel through Uganda did not establish that she contracted the virus there.
Ugandan health officials said the country had no confirmed active Ebola cases at the time of their statement and that the location where the woman was exposed to the virus remained under investigation.
The Ugandan authorities also sought detailed information from Nigeria about the woman’s travel itinerary and clinical history.
The requested information is important because investigators need to establish where the woman travelled, when potential exposure occurred, when symptoms developed and which people might have been exposed during her journey.
Such details can help health authorities reconstruct the patient’s movements, assess possible exposure risks and determine whether additional contact tracing or other public health measures are necessary.
Uganda’s Director General of Health Services, Professor Charles Olaro, said the information was needed to guide further investigations and determine whether additional contact tracing was required.
Uganda also maintained that travelling through its territory was not sufficient evidence that the infection originated there.
The distinction matters because the confirmed case involves a cross-border journey, but the route taken by an infected traveller does not, by itself, establish where transmission occurred.
Uganda’s request consequently centres on obtaining the information needed to investigate the circumstances of the infection, rather than accepting that the woman contracted Ebola in Uganda.
Sowore Questions Nigeria’s Public Health Coordination
Sowore used the disagreement over information-sharing to question the effectiveness of Nigeria’s disease surveillance and coordination with other countries.
“If these accounts are accurate, why has Nigeria not promptly provided the necessary information?” he asked.
His question reflects concern about the speed with which relevant information is shared during an international public health incident.
However, the available statements establish that Uganda requested further details; they do not independently prove that Nigerian officials deliberately withheld information or that a confirmed delay caused additional infections.
The issue nevertheless highlights why international communication matters during an outbreak. When a patient has travelled between countries, health authorities may need to exchange information to assess possible exposure, identify contacts and coordinate surveillance.
The task force established by Tinubu was intended to improve coordination among Nigerian institutions and strengthen preparedness against imported infections. Whether the current response has met those objectives will depend on documented actions, the speed of information-sharing and the effectiveness of the containment measures.
Sowore Raises Concerns About Political Freedoms
Sowore’s criticism extends beyond the composition of the task force and the exchange of medical information.
In his statement, he warned against using the Ebola emergency to restrict democratic participation or fundamental freedoms ahead of the 2027 general elections.
“Public health emergencies must never become excuses for suppressing democratic participation or restricting fundamental freedoms,” he said.
He also questioned Tinubu’s political intentions, declaring: “I firmly believe he knows he cannot win a genuinely free and fair electoral contest.”
Sowore added: “I cannot put anything beyond Tinubu and his political agenda.”
These are the activist’s political allegations and opinions; they do not establish that the Federal Government intends to interfere with the elections.
He further argued: “Public health must protect lives, not become an instrument of political control.”
His comments place the outbreak within a broader political argument about government accountability, transparency and civil liberties. However, any claim that the government intends to use Ebola measures to influence the electoral process would require supporting evidence.
The Questions Facing Nigeria’s Ebola Task Force
The confirmed case has brought the task force’s responsibilities into sharper focus.
The government announced the committee in June, approved ₦10 billion for emergency preparedness and outlined measures involving airport screening, border monitoring, isolation facilities and coordination among government agencies.
The October case now provides a practical test of those arrangements. Relevant questions include how quickly suspected infections are identified, whether health authorities can obtain accurate travel histories, how efficiently agencies exchange information and whether contact tracing reaches everyone who may have been exposed.
For now, the Federal Government has confirmed one case in Abuja and reported that 44 close contacts had been identified. Uganda has requested further travel and clinical details while maintaining that the patient’s transit through its territory does not prove where the infection occurred.
Sowore’s criticism has therefore brought together three issues: the political leadership of the task force, the quality of Nigeria’s public health coordination and the government’s accountability during an emergency.
The answers will depend on verifiable evidence of how the response operates, what information the relevant authorities exchange and whether the preventive structures announced in June are functioning effectively.
